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 Japanese companies long enjoyed unchallenged predominant position in 
Asia. There were practically no local Asian companies that challenged 
Japanese companies in such industries as electric home appliances, electric 
parts, semiconductors, automobiles and their parts, machines, precision 
instruments, office machines, chemicals, iron and steel, ship building, and 
synthetic fibers. In the industries of labor intensive and low technology 
there were some local Asian companies that were competitive in the 
international market. However, in the high technology industries Japanese 
companies enjoyed monopolistic position in the Asian market. 
 At the macro economic level Japan still maintains predominant position in 
Asia even at the present time. Japan’s GDP share in Asia has been rather 
high through 1980s and 1990s as it is shown in Table 1. It was 63 percent in 
1980, and was 66 percent in 1999. Japan has maintained rather high share 








  But when we pay attention to micro level phenomena, that is, behavior and 
performance of Japanese companies, we see the symptoms of weakening 
Japan’s predominance in Asia.   
  Japanese companies have lost the number one position in many industries. 
In the industries of iron and steel, shipbuilding, and synthetic fibers, Asian 
local companies are now occupying the number one position. And there are 
severe competitions between Japanese companies and Asian companies in   2 
many industries such as electric home appliances, semiconductors, PC 
(personal computers), mobile phones and motorcycles. There are less and 
less industries where Japanese companies enjoy predominant positions. 
Some of the examples may include the industries of automobiles and their 
parts, sophisticated electric parts and semiconductors, manufacturing 
equipment for semiconductors, industrial robots, engineering plastics and 
pharmaceuticals.  
 Why are Japanese companies loosing the competitive power in Asia? Is the 
Japanese way of management the cause for the declining predominance of 
Japanese companies in Asia? How are Asian companies strengthening their 
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Management by Japanese Persons 
 
  There are thousands of Japanese companies operating in Asia. Most of 
them have Japanese CEOs who are dispatched from their Japanese parent 
companies. According to the author’s questionnaire survey data, Japanese 
companies in Singapore and Taiwan that have Japanese CEOs amount to 80 
percent in Taiwan and 92 percent in Singapore. (Yoshihara 1996, p.21) 
Japanese companies in other Asian countries probably have more or less 
similar percentage ratio. 
  Localization of management at Asian subsidiaries is a management 
problem which Japanese companies have long tried to solve. I conducted 
field research in Bangkok, Thailand in 1974 on personnel problems of 
Japanese companies. One of the findings of my research was that Japanese 
companies had more expatriates than American and European firms. In 
other words, localization of the management of Japanese firms was lagging 
behind Western companies. (Yoshihara 1975) 
 Japanese companies have accomplished substantial achievement in the 
localization of management at lower and middle management levels. 
Supervisors at factories and sales managers at offices are now mostly local 
people. Even at the management level of functional department heads, the   3 
localization has made good progress.   
 
  However, the localization has made no progress at the CEOs. The 
percentage ratio of the overseas subsidiaries that have CEOs of local 
nationals is 38 percent in 1972, 47 percent in 1981, 35 percent in 1990 and 
22 percent in 1994. (Yoshihara 1995) When we see important large Asian 
subsidiaries, we will probably find that most of the CEOs are still Japanese 
expatriates.  
 In 1989 I had a chance to make a speech at the managing directors 
meeting of the subsidiaries in Asia (not including China) and Oceania of 
Matsushita Electric Industrial. All managers were Japanese. Now, the 
company has nearly one hundred subsidiaries in the region. The 
subsidiaries that have local CEOs are only two. The company has more than 
thirty subsidiaries in China and all of them have Japanese CEOs. This 
company is not exceptional. On the contrary, many Japanese multinationals 
share the low rate of localization of CEOs at their foreign subsidiaries in 
Asia. 
  In addition to the CEOs and other senior managers at the top management 
level, there are many Japanese expatriates who are not managers but are 
advisory staff. However, it is not uncommon that these Japanese advisers 
play the role of managers. 
 Here, let us pay attention to the localization of the management of foreign 
companies in Japan, that is, Japanese subsidiaries of American and 
European multinationals, and compare it with the case of Japanese 
multinationals. (Khan and Yoshihara 1994) 
 Nearly two thirds (63%) of foreign companies in Japan have local Japanese 
CEOs. This is in sharp contrast to the case of the foreign subsidiaries of 
Japanese multinationals. Only 22 percent subsidiaries have CEOs of local 
nationality. Localization at the level of department head also is more 
progressed at foreign companies in Japan than at the foreign subsidiaries of 
Japanese companies.   
  American and European multinationals have further promoted the 
localization of management than Japanese multinationals in other countries, 
too. According to a research that compares the localization of the 
management of American, European and Japanese multinationals, the 
percentage ratio of the foreign subsidiaries that have CEOs of local   4 
nationality is the highest at American companies (69%), followed by 
European firms (52%) and lowest at Japanese companies (26%). (Kopp 
1994b) 
 Another research that compares the localization of marketing managers in 
China also shows that Japanese companies are behind Western companies. 
Japanese companies have sixteen marketing managers who are Japanese 
expatriates and only two Chinese managers. Western companies have only 
three managers who are expatriates and thirteen Chinese managers. (Yachi 
1999) 
 The characteristic of Japanese style international management explained 
above, that is, the management by Japanese persons, is more evident at 
non-manufacturing companies than manufacturing companies. Sogo shosha 
is a good example.   
  Nearly all of the CEOs of overseas offices (presidents of overseas 
subsidiaries or heads of overseas branches) are Japanese expatriates. 
Non-Japanese CEOs are exceptions and they usually work at less important 
branches in smaller countries and cities. The only exception that the author 
identifies is the case of Itochu. The CEO of U.S. and British subsidiary firms 
is non-Japanese. The name of the person is J. W. Chai. He once worked in 
Japan before he joined Itochu and has no difficulty with the Japanese 
language. 
  Nine sogo shosha have 1248 overseas branches and subsidiaries. 
(Yoshihara 2001b) The total number of employees of these overseas 
organizations is 24929, out of which Japanese expatriates are 4625. Thus, 
nearly twenty percent (19%) of the total employees at overseas subsidiaries 
and branches are Japanese expatriates. And they take top and middle 
management positions, and play key roles in the management.   
 In the case of manufacturing multinationals, the number of Japanese 
expatriates is much smaller than sogo shosha. The Japanese expatriates 
amount to only 2.3 percent of the total employees at overseas subsidiaries. 
(Yoshihara 2001a, p.205)   
 
 
Management in the Japanese Language 
 
 The second characteristic of the Japanese style international management   5 
is the management in the Japanese language. 
 The three kinds of languages are used at Japanese multinationals as 
shown in Figure 1. (Yoshihara, 2001a, p.222) 
At operation sites in Japan such as factories, sales branches, R&D 
organizations and offices the Japanese language is used. In a similar way at 
operation sites of foreign subsidiaries communication is done in the local 
language. Either Japanese or English, or both of the Japanese and the 
English languages are used in the international communication. We define 
information exchange between the Japanese staff and the foreign staff as 
international communication. The international communication is typically 
done between the Japanese head offices and the foreign subsidiaries. It is 
also done at Japanese parent companies when Japanese and foreigners 
discuss and exchange information. We also see international communication 
at foreign subsidiaries when local managers and Japanese expatriates meet 
to discuss and make decisions. It is noteworthy that the Japanese language 








  Let me elaborate on this point. 
 First, when Japanese people at the Japanese head offices send information 
to foreign subsidiaries, they often send it in the Japanese language. For 
example, when Japanese staff at the Japanese parent companies make 
telephone calls to their subsidiaries in Taiwan and Singapore, they use the 
Japanese language to communicate with almost all subsidiaries in the two 
countries ; 93 percent of all subsidiaries in Taiwan and 74 percent in 
Singapore. They use English only with 8 percent of the subsidiaries in 
Singapore. They never use English when they call to their Taiwanese 
subsidiaries. Mixture of Japanese and English in telephone conversation is 
observed at 18 percent (Singapore) and 7 percent (Taiwan) of the 
subsidiaries. (Yoshihara 2001a, p.226) 
 Communication by FAX is the similar situation. When Japanese staff at   6 
Japanese parent companies send information by FAX to their subsidiaries in 
Taiwan and Singapore, they use the Japanese language to 87 percent 
(Taiwan) and 57 percent (Singapore) of all subsidiaries in the two countries. 
FAX message in English is sent to only 2 percent (Taiwan) and 16 percent 
(Singapore) of the subsidiaries. 
 At foreign subsidiaries the Japanese language is not so frequently used. It 
is used only in the communication among Japanese staff. In the 
communication among local staff, local language is used. And, 
communication between local and Japanese staff is usually done in English. 
 According to the data from my questionnaire survey, at the meeting where 
both Japanese and local persons attend, English is used at 64 percent of all 
subsidiaries in Singapore. The Japanese language is used only at 3 percent 
of the subsidiaries. There are some subsidiaries (29%) that use both 
Japanese and English. The situation of the use of language in Taiwanese 
subsidiaries is quite different. There is no subsidiary that uses English at 
the meeting where both Japanese and Taiwanese attend. Both Japanese and 
Taiwanese staff use the Japanese language.   
  I do not have the data for other Asian countries. Based on my field research 
I estimate the language situation at Asian subsidiaries of Japanese 
companies in other Asian countries as the following. Singapore represents 
the country where English is the common language. Taiwan, on the other 
hand, is the country where the Japanese language is widely used. Other 
Asian countries are somewhere between these two extreme cases. The 
Philippines, Malaysia and Hong Kong are similar to Singapore and Korea is 
like Taiwan. Thailand, Indonesia and China are between these two groups. 
  As a characteristic of the language usage in the international 
communication of Japanese companies, I would like to point out that 
important information is usually exchanged in the Japanese language. In 
exchanging information on routine operations between Japanese parent 
companies and their foreign subsidiaries, English is usually used. But, when 
Japanese managers at the Japanese parent companies talk on the telephone, 
write or FAX to foreign subsidiaries on rather important business matters 
such as personnel problems of top management, large scale investment, 
introduction of new products, change of marketing strategy, they usually 
communicate in the Japanese language. As their English language ability is 
limited, they have difficulties in communicating in English about these   7 
important matters. 
 The above examination reveals two points concerning the language in the 
international communication of Japanese companies. First, Japanese parent 
companies send information to their foreign subsidiaries more often in the 
Japanese language than in English or other foreign languages. Second, 
important information is usually exchanged in the Japanese language 
between the Japanese parent companies and their foreign subsidiaries. 
Considering these two points I would like to summarize that the 
characteristic of the Japanese style international management is the 
management in the Japanese language. 
 Here, let me point that the above mentioned two characteristics, that is, 
the management by Japanese persons and the management in the Japanese 
language are closely related to each other.   
 When Japanese expatriates play important roles at foreign subsidiaries, 
the Japanese language tends to be de facto common official language. It is 
natural that Japanese expatriates use the Japanese language in their 
international communication. And when the Japanese language is used, 
local persons have difficulties in participating in the information exchange 
and decision making process. Thus, capable local people do not want to work 
at Japanese companies. So, the Japanese head offices think that they need 
to send more Japanese people to their subsidiaries to supplement the 
shortage of staff. As the number of Japanese expatriates increases at foreign 
offices, the amount of Japanese language used at foreign subsidiaries will 
proportionately increase. Thus, there exists a kind of vicious circle between 




Japanese Central Hub Model 
 
 The third characteristic of the Japanese style international management is 
the Japanese central hub model. 
  In international business of Japanese multinationals the parent companies 
in Japan are in the center of the multinational corporate system. The 
foreign subsidiaries are peripheral organizations. The Japanese parent 
companies transfer their resources such as technology, know-how and brand   8 
to their overseas subsidiaries. The transfer is one way from the Japanese 
parent companies to their overseas subsidiaries. There is practically no 
reverse transfer from the foreign subsidiaries to their parent companies.   
 Foreign subsidiaries are dependent on the Japanese parent companies. 
They do not stand on their own foot. They cannot survive without constant 
transfer of resources from their Japanese parent companies. The foreign 
subsidiaries are like Japanese students who live on the money sent from 
their parents. 
 The Japanese parent companies dispatch Japanese managers, experts and 
engineers to their foreign subsidiaries. There is almost no reverse flow of 
personnel from the overseas subsidiaries to their Japanese parent 
companies.  
 The relationship between the Japanese parent companies and their foreign 
subsidiaries is linear. Each foreign subsidiary has a close relationship with 
the Japanese parent companies. On the other hand, the relationship among 
overseas subsidiaries is not developed.   
 The central hub model of Japanese multinationals that was explained 








3. Bright and Dark Sides of Japanese Companies in Asia 
 
Successful Japanese Production System 
 
 The Japanese production system has been developed and practiced in 
Japan. It is the basis of international competitiveness of Japanese 
manufacturers. It is noteworthy that Japanese production system works not 
only in Japan but also in foreign countries including Asian countries. 
Manufacturing subsidiaries in Asia have practiced Japanese production 
system and have been achieving good performance.   
 The Japanese production system is composed of such elements as 5s   9 
campaign, workers of multi-functions, information sharing among workers, 
participation of workers in problem solving, egalitarian treatment of 
workers and managers. Japanese style personnel management is a 
supportive factor of Japanese production system. Employment security, 
internal promotion, seniority-based wages and promotion, on-the-job 
training (OJT), and company unions are closely related with Japanese 
production system. 
  The Japanese production system is attractive to local workers and 
supervisors at Asian factories of Japanese companies. Their employment is 
highly secured. They are encouraged to use their brains and participate in 
problem solving activities. They appreciate egalitarian treatment that is 
designed to minimize the difference of status between workers and 
managers. Workers and managers wear the same work uniforms, have the 
same meals at factory canteens, use the same rest rooms, and work 
according to the same time table (the start and the end of the daily works), 
etc. 
 Japanese factories in Asia are bright in the sense that they are doing well 
with motivated local supervisors and workers under their Japanese 
production system.   
 More and more Asian local companies have tried to learn and practice the 
Japanese production system. The Japanese production system is now widely 
practiced in Asia and contributes to production innovation in Asia. 
 
 
Limits of Japanese Style International Management 
 
 Japanese companies in Asia are attractive to local workers as it is 
explained above. On the contrary, they are not attractive to capable local 
managerial, professional and engineering people. There may be several 
reasons. Here I would like to pay attention to the three characteristics of the 
Japanese style international management that we saw in the last section of 
this paper.   
 The first characteristic is the management by Japanese persons. The 
position of the CEOs and many of the other important positions are occupied 
by Japanese expatriates. Promotion opportunities of the local persons, 
especially managerial persons are rather limited. Thus, it is natural that   10 
they abandon their aspiration for promotion to top positions in the 
companies. It is said that at foreign subsidiaries of Japanese companies 
there exists glass ceiling or rice paper ceiling for the promotion of local 
persons. (Kopp 1994a) 
 The second characteristic is the management in the Japanese language. 
Unless local people do not understand the Japanese language, they have 
difficulties in participating in the information exchange and decision 
making process. At Japanese companies, information about important 
matters is often exchanged in the Japanese language and decisions on policy 
matters are usually made in the Japanese language. There are not many 
foreign people who understand the Japanese language. The Japanese 
language is a minor language as a language for international business. The 
de facto common language of the international business is English. 
Japanese multinationals that use the Japanese language as the common 
language have handicaps in conducting international business. One of the 
handicaps is that they have difficulty in recruiting capable local managerial 
and professional persons. 
  The third characteristic is the Japanese central hub model. At the 
Japanese multinationals the core employees are Japanese who work at the 
Japanese parent companies and their overseas subsidiaries. They 
participate in the mainstream of information and decision making process. 
On the other hand, local persons have difficulty in participating in the 
information sharing and decision making process because of the Japanese 
language barrier and the closed nature of Japanese style management. 
Local persons are peripheral employees. 
 Compared with domestic firms, multinational enterprises are in a position 
to enjoy the advantage of utilizing local resources. Probably the most 
important local resources are local human resources, especially high level 
human resources such as managerial, professional and engineering people. 
The Japanese multinationals do not enjoy that advantage because of their 
Japanese style international management. At factories capable local 
workers and supervisors work with high morale and achieve good 
performance. On the other hand, at administrative offices and R&D 
organizations there are not many first class talented local managerial, 
professional and engineering persons. Those who are employed at Japanese 
companies generally work with low morale and complaints.   11 
 At Japanese companies in China employment security is maintained. 
Workload is light and pace of work is rather slow. Wages are low and the 
pace of wage increase is slow. Age and education are important factors in 
determining wages and posts. Competition among managers for wages and 
posts are restrained. Cooperation and teamwork are emphasized. Consensus 
is sought in decision making and thus decision making takes time. Good 
human relationship with Japanese expatriates is required. Work discipline 
is emphasized. There are many Chinese managers who are critical about 
Japanese companies with these characteristics. It is said that recently 
Chinese people tend to consider Japanese companies as state-owned 
Chinese enterprises. On the other hand, as we will see later in the present 
paper, Chinese companies are becoming more like capitalistic enterprises. 
And it should be noted that Japanese companies do not attract capable 
Chinese persons.   
  I made an interviewing research in Taiwan last year with two 
co-researchers. We visited three Taiwanese companies in the Science-based 
Industrial Park. The names of the companies we visited are UMS, Winbond 
Electronics and Macronix International. We also visited three European 
companies, that is, Philips, BASF and Image. At the end of the field 
research I asked the following question to a Taiwanese interpreter who was 
the employee of Taiwan Matsushita Electric. “What is your impression of 
Taiwanese companies and European firms? “ He said, “I now think that I am 
like a civil servant working at a public organization.” 
 Dr. Ren-Jye Liu. Professor at Tunghai University in Taiwan recently told 
me the similar story about Japanese companies in Taiwan. (note 1) There 
are many young Taiwanese people who regret that they chose Japanese 
companies to work for. Although employment security is rather high, wages 
are not high and promotion opportunities are limited. Pace of wage increase 
and promotion is slow. Organization culture is rigid. Young people and 
female employees have little opportunity for extending their capabilities. To 
the eyes of Taiwanese young capable people Japanese companies are like 
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  Chinese Management Geared to Free Market Competition 
 
  China’s share in world production is rapidly increasing. Main 
manufacturers of high technology products such as electronics products and 
automobiles are foreign companies in China. But Chinese local companies 
are becoming important players in these industrial fields, also. An example 
is Haier Group. 
 Haier is the largest Chinese company of electric home appliances. It is 
ranked the ninth position in the world appliance manufacturers. (Appliance 
Manufacturer, February 2001) 
  Our analysis shows that Haier has achieved rapid growth by two 
reasons.(note 2) The first reason is latecomer advantage. Haier introduced 
technology from foreign companies like German and Japanese companies. It 
learns foreign technology, digests it, and adapts it to Chinese local market 
conditions. These days Haier quickly develops new products day by day.   
  The second reason of Haier’s rapid growth is its management. The 
characteristic of Haier’s management may be most evidently represented in 
its personnel management of “horse race” without horse judge (the word 
“horse race” is used in the company). 
  At Haier there is no advance evaluation of employees. Everyone is given an 
equal opportunity to engage in job. Only after he or she finishes the job, he 
or she is evaluated for his or her results. Thus, at Haier an employee (horse) 
is not evaluated as a good horse or a bad horse by personnel experts (horse 
judge) before the race. Every horse is given the chance to run the race. After 
the race the horse is evaluated on the record and given monetary reward or 
penalty. This horse race is applied not only to workers but also to 
managerial persons. 
  The personnel management of Haier has the following characteristics: 
 
    Individual evaluation (not group evaluation) 
    Instantaneous evaluation (not long term evaluation) 
    Monetary reward and penalty 
    Openness about the rules and the results of evaluation 
    Evaluation based on quantitative records   13 
ç Demotion of fixed rate of inferior employees 
 
  Let me make some remarks on these characteristics. 
 First, workers and managers are evaluated individually. Teamwork or 
group activities are not considered in the evaluation. 
 Second, evaluation is done without any delay after the job. Workers are 
evaluated everyday. They can know the result of their evaluation when they 
finish their jobs in the evening. They record their job performance and by 
the record they can know the result of the evaluation (amount of daily 
wages). 
 Third, reward and punishment is done in money terms. Their wages are 
daily wages on a piece rate. When they do their jobs rightly, they are given 
the wages on a piece rate. When they do jobs badly, they are given penalty. 
When they find bad jobs of the workers who are just before them on the 
production line, they are given reward. 
  Fourth, the rules of evaluation are open to employees. They know how they 
are evaluated. And the results of the evaluation are shown on the notice 
board on the wall of the shop floor every evening after the job. The results 
(record of jobs and amount of daily wages with reward and penalty) are 
shown individually with the names of workers. 
 Fifth, evaluation is made only on the performance record of the jobs. The 
performance record is quantitative evaluation of their jobs. There is no room 
for discretionary evaluation by supervisors and managers. 
 Last, workers and managers of inferior records are automatically demoted. 
In the case of managers the worst 5 percent of managers are demoted 
annually. Workers are classified into three categories based on the records. 
They are “excellent workers”, “good workers” and “trial workers”. The trial 
workers will be fired unless they improve their evaluation. 
 The personnel management of Haier is almost opposite to the Japanese 
style management. In China, as I mentioned earlier in the paper Japanese 
companies are seen as state-owned enterprises. We may well say that Haier 
is more capitalistic than Japanese companies.   
  It is my understanding that Haier is not an exception in China. Among fast 
growing Chinese local companies there must be many companies that are 
more or less like Haier. The capitalistic and competitive management of 
Chinese companies well fit to Chinese people. Physical, psychological and   14 
intellectual energy of Chinese people is fully utilized under the Chinese 
capitalistic management. 
  The Chinese capitalistic management may be a reaction to the old 
management of socialism. Under the old socialistic management there were 
no layoffs. Wages were guaranteed. Wages were determined on age, 
education, and other political factors. Wage increase and promotion were 
much influenced by human relationship with bosses and political party 
organizations. There existed no incentives for motivating individuals to 
work harder and compete to one another. 
 
 
Conflict between Socialism and Market Economy 
 
 Since the economic reform and open door policy in1978, China has been 
achieving a high economic growth for more than twenty years. The average 
rate of the growth is more than ten percent. This long and high economic 
growth is beyond anticipation of most economists and other experts. 
 Let us look at the economic achievement of China comparing with other 
countries which have been undergoing the transition from the centralized 
planning economy to the free market economy. 
 GDP of China doubled in eight years. If we take the GDP of China in 1989 
as 100.0 point, the GDP point in 1997 is 210.2. Among the countries in 
Central Europe, Eastern Europe, Russia and South Western Asia, Poland is 
the only country that has been successful in increasing GDP. Its GDP point 
in 1997 is 118.8 compared with 100.0 point in 1989. Other countries 
decreased GDP in the last eight years. GDP of Russia decreased to almost 
half size from 100.0 in 1989 to 52.2 in 1997. For information, the economic 
performance of Vietnam is the second best just behind China. Its GDP in 
1997 is 175.2. (Miura 2000) 
 China and Vietnam have promoted the same strategy of economic growth. 
They maintain the politics of socialism with one party system. And under 
this political system they have promoted market economy. Their strategy is 
sometimes called gradual strategy. On the other hand, other countries have 
pursued the radical strategy or the so-called big ban strategy. They changed 
their political system and economic system at the same time.   
 The good performance of the past twenty years or so shows us that the   15 
China’s economic reform and open door policy has been successful. Will 
China continue its high economic growth in the future? 
 The answer depends on the understanding of the nature of China’s 
economic policy. The policy of the socialist market economy has two 
elements, that is, the politics of socialism and the market economy. In 
principle the two elements seem to be incompatible.   
 As the market economy of China develops, the conflict between the politics 
of socialism and the market economy will become large. When the conflict 
becomes too strong, the development of market economy will be restrained 
to within the limits of the politics of socialism. The growth of China’s 
economy will slow down in the future. Or, the politics of socialism will be 
changed to democratic political system that is compatible with the market 
economy. In either case substantial political disturbance and economic 
slow-down will be inevitable. 
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Investment in Asia and Hollowing out in Japan 
 
 Export was most important in the international business strategy of 
Japanese manufacturing companies until 1985. In 1985 the Plaza Accord 
was reached and then the sharp appreciation of Japanese yen started. From 
1986 Japanese companies began to change their international strategy from 
export to local production. Since then overseas production has occupied 
central position in the international business strategy.   
  As the site for production, Japan is no longer the best place. Japan has lost 
much of attractiveness for production. Wages are high. Wages of Japanese 
workers are more than ten times higher than those of Malaysian and Thai 
workers. Wages of Chinese young female workers in Cantonese area are 
about one thirtieth of Japanese workers. Japanese people, especially young 
people dislike working at factories. At Japanese factories there are many 
middle-aged female workers.  They cannot compete with Asian young 
female workers who have good eyesight and are dexterous. Cost of lands is 
still high. Costs of industrial infrastructures such as electricity, water, 
telecommunication, domestic transportation may be the highest in the world.   16 
There are many regulations that make Japanese managers consume lots of 
time and energy.   
 Increasing number of Japanese companies shift their domestic production 
to overseas. They decrease or stop domestic production and increase foreign 
production. This kind of shift of production to overseas is most evident for 
matured products. In addition even the production of newly developed and 
technologically sophisticated products are being shifted from domestic 
factories to foreign factories, especially to Asian factories. Moreover, the 
production of some of newly developed products starts not at Japanese 
factories but at overseas plants. 
 This kind of shift of production from Japan to Asia causes hollowing out of 
Japanese production.  We may classify the hollowing out of production into 
three types as follows. (Yoshihara 2001a, p.117) The first type is the relative 
decrease of production in Japan. Production in Japan increases, but 
overseas production increases more than in Japan. This type of hollowing 
out of production largely started after 1985. The second type of hollowing is 
the absolute decrease of production in Japan. Japanese companies decrease 
or stop production at their Japanese factories and shifted the production to 
their foreign plants. This type of hollowing is not uncommon any more. 
Examples are seen in the production of audio-visual products such as TV 
and VCR. 
 The above two types of hollowing out of production is the decrease of 
production in Japan in a quantitative sense. On the other hand, the third 
type is related to the qualitative sense. Not only assembling or fabricating 
final products, but also the production of parts, devices and materials is 
shifted from Japanese factories to overseas plants. Production of 
manufacturing equipment, molds, jigs and development of production 
software are now being shifted to overseas factories. In short, core 
production activities and capabilities are gradually being shifted from 
Japanese parent companies to foreign subsidiaries. Will the Japanese 
parent companies become empty at the center of the production activities? 
  The hollowing out of Japanese parent companies is not limited to 
production. It is extending toward R&D activities. Although the scale is still 
in small, even R&D activities have started to shift abroad. Nearly half (47%) 
of the foreign manufacturing subsidiaries are engaged in some kind of R&D 
activities. In Asia the subsidiaries which conduct R&D activities amount to   17 
37%. Even in China one third (32%) of the subsidiaries do R&D activities. 
(Yoshihara, Methe and Iwata 1999) 
 The home ground of Japanese multinational enterprises is Japan. Their 
main business activities such as R&D, production, marketing and 
administration are still done in Japan. And Japanese companies develop 
their resources and capabilities based on these activities done in their home 
ground. The resources and capabilities developed at Japanese parent 
companies are prime sources of their international competitiveness. As the 
hollowing out of Japanese home ground proceeds, Japanese companies will 
lose their core competitive capabilities. 
 Changes in nature of production in Japan also are weakening competitive 
advantages of Japanese production system. 
 One of the strengths of Japanese production system is that it is good at 
incremental innovation. Many small improvements are made and practiced 
at shop floors. And they lead to low production cost and low rate of rejected 
products. But these days the incremental innovation is not so important as 
before. First, the production situation has drastically changed. Products 
change much more rapidly than before. In the case of personal computers, 
one product model lasts only three to six months. The duration of production 
is too short to realize the incremental innovation. Cost of production, 
rejected rate of production in the factories and quality of products are 
basically determined at the product development stages. There remains 
little room for improvement on these points at the production stage. 
 
 Second, the incremental innovation is important at the final fabrication or 
assemble stages of production. Recently this stage of production is mostly 
shifted to overseas factories. At Japanese factories production activities are 
concentrated on parts, devices and materials. The incremental innovation 
has little room in these production activities. 
 
 
Resistance to Change 
 
  Japanese companies are plagued with resistance to change. 
 The so-called lifetime employment system is a major factor that resists 
changes at Japanese companies. No Japanese company has ever publicly   18 
declared the policy of lifetime employment. But many companies have 
pursued the goal of employment security alongside the goal of growth and 
profitability. It is not uncommon that drastic reduction of employees is 
avoided even when that sort of action is necessary to realize recovery in 
profitability and growth. It is more common that Japanese companies resort 
to milder measure of gradual reduction of employees. They first reduce 
temporary employees. And they reduce or stop new employment. They also 
encourage early retirement. Thus, it takes time to reduce employees. Drastic 
changes involving reduction of employees in a short period of time is rare at 
Japanese companies. 
 Keiretsu is another factor that works against Japanese companies to 
change. Keiretsu is a stable trade relationship between assembling 
companies and their suppliers. It is most developed in the automobile 
industry, but it exists widely in many industries in Japan. As it is a stable 
trade relationship that is based on stable transaction over long period, the 
system cannot be easily changed. Both assembling companies and suppliers 
develop specific tangible and non-tangible assets that are well fitted to this 
special type of trade relationship. Suppliers are mostly small and medium 
sized companies. Thus, big assembling companies hesitate to introduce 
changes in the trade relationship since they do not want to be blamed for 
bankruptcy of abandoned suppliers. Assembling companies may have to 
experience real crisis to get rid of traditional keiretsu. Nissan Motor may be 
a good case. 
 
 
Management by Internally Promoted Old Men 
 
 At large Japanese companies new university graduates are hired every 
year. They stay in the same companies for a long time. When they become 
around fifty years old, one or two of them are promoted to the post of 
directors. And, they are promoted to the higher positions and one of them 
becomes the president around the age of sixty. This pattern of promotion is 
widely observed among Japanese companies. 
 Regarding the presidents of Japanese companies three characteristics are 
noteworthy. The first is the internal promotion. It is a common practice that 
presidents are promoted internally from the existing board members. It is   19 
rare that presidents are scouted from outside. The second characteristic is 
that the existing presidents decide the next presidents. The third 
characteristic is that presidents are rather old. Although there is no exact 
data, we may assume that on average they become the presidents at the age 
of around sixty at large Japanese companies. The presidents who are 
younger than fifty years old are very rare in Japan.   
  Because of these three characteristics, the presidents of Japanese 
companies lack in strong power bases that are necessary to exercise 
leadership. 
 First, the internal promotion restrains drastic changes in strategy and 
management of companies. The internally promoted presidents are 
embedded in the existing organizations and are accustomed to the current 
situations. They lack in novel ideas and outsider’s view about their 
companies.  
  Second, the presidents have difficulty in denying the strategy and 
management of predecessors who appointed them the presidents. The newly 
appointed presidents are under pressure to accept the existing practices. 
What they can do is to make gradual and incremental changes. Radical 
changes in a short period of time are almost impossible. 
 Third, the presidents of Japanese companies may be too old to work hard 
and to exercise strong leadership.   
 Generally speaking, unless companies are in real crisis, it is difficult to 
realize drastic changes in strategy and management. Japanese companies 
have been in troubles for more than ten years since the burst of the bubble 
economy in 1990. Is the crisis serious enough so that Japanese companies 
start to make drastic changes in their strategy and management? 
 
Notes Notes Notes Notes       
 
1. Based on our conversation at the Annual Conference of the Association of 
Japanese Business Studies (AJBS) in Seinajoki, Finland on June 11, 2001. 
 
2. Based on my joint research with Ms. Taohua Ouyang. She is the Assistant 
Professor of Management School, Zhongshan University in Guangzou, 
China and is the graduate student of Business School, Kobe University in 
Kobe, Japan.   20 
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Table  1       Japan’s  GDP  Share  in  Asia 
 
[ US$ billions / (%)] 
  1980 1985 1990 1995 1999 
Japan  1059 1343 2970 5137 4500 
  (63) (66) (71) (70) (66) 
China  302 305 388 700 989 
  (18)  (15) (9) (10)  (14) 
Far Eastern  132 191 488 888 854 
three countries  (8)  (9)  (12) (12) (12) 
ASEAN  179 207 324 617 506 
five countries  (11)  (10)  (8) (8) (7) 
Total  1672 2046 4170 7342 6849 




1.  Far Eastern three countries are Korea, Taiwan and Hong Kong. 
2. ASEAN five countries are Singapore, Malaysia, Thailand, Indonesia and 
Philippines. 
3.  Sources: East Asian Economic Perspectives, Vol.12, Special Issue, February 2001, 
the International Center for the Study of East Asian Development (ICSEAD). 
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1.  white zone : operations sites (factories, sales branches, offices, R&D organizations) 
2.  gray zone : management 
3.             : international communication between Japanese parent companies 
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1.  center circle: Japanese parent companies 
2.  peripheral circles: foreign subsidiaries 
3.  lines with arrows: transfer of resources 
 